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Abstract
This article analyzes the economics of Corporate Social Responsible behav-
iors, namely the voluntary integration of environmental, social and governance
factors in firms’ strategy. We review theoretical and empirical literature and
provide a unified framework of the forces driving corporate social responsibil-
ity, relying on three categories of market imperfections: the existence of exter-
nalities and public good; consumer heterogeneity; and imperfects contracts.
The impacts of corporate social responsibility on corporate performance and
society are also surveyed and the lack of knowledge on the latter leads to a
research agenda.
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1 Introduction
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has gained considerable attention over the past
two decades and firms now increasingly struggle to become, or at least to appear as
socially responsible. In 2010 almost two thirds of the biggest firms in industrialized
countries have published a report on CSR or on sustainable development policies
(KPMG, 2011). At the same time, a considerable attention in the literature has been
given to the determinants of CSR and its impact on firm performance, especially in
the field of management sciences and economics of organizations.
Being socially responsible means that, beyond legal constraints, firms take respon-
sibility for their impacts on society. A prerequisite is the respect for applicable
legislation and collective agreements between social partners. Further on, socially
responsible enterprises should integrate social, environmental, ethical, human rights
and consumer concerns into their business operations and core strategy with the
double aim of maximizing the creation of shared value for their shareholders, stake-
holders and society; and identifying, preventing and mitigating their possible adverse
impacts (European Commission, 2011). This official definition hides in practice a
wide range of socially responsible behaviors that may be clustered into three wide
domains with the purpose of practicality: environmental, social and governance
(ESG) factors.
The Environmental component refers to the incorporation into the design, manufac-
turing and distribution of products of environmental considerations such as pollu-
tion prevention and control; protection of water resources; biodiversity conservation;
waste management; management of local pollution; or management of environmen-
tal impacts from transportation. The Social component refers to proactive human
resources management (training and career development, employee participation,
quality of working conditions) and may include as well contributions to local and
general interest causes, respect for the human rights and elimination of child labor.
Lastly, the Governance component refers to the firms’ practices towards shareholders
(respect for their rights, promotion of independent and competent administrators
and auditors, transparency of key executive compensation) and can be extended
to business behaviors towards customers and suppliers (prevention of conflicts of
interest, corruption or anti-competitive practices; product safety; information to
consumers; integration of CSR in the supply chain).
Whereas the concept of CSR rather aligns with sustainable development aspirations,
the question of why would firms engage in CSR and its actual impact is far from
trivial. For Friedman (1970) indeed, the sole responsibility of businesses is to increase
profits. Corporations should not substitute for elected government to provide public
goods and spend shareholders’ money for ’doing good’ without benefiting from the
required political legitimacy. Yet, as highlighted by Be´nabou and Tirole (2010),
CSR represents a response to market and redistributive imperfections because of
government failures or in order to promote values that are not shared by law makers.
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In this article, we present a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on
the determinants and consequences of CSR using an economic lens. This economic
perspective enables us to provide a unified framework of the forces driving CSR. In
turn, CSR may arise from three categories of market imperfections, which structure
our review. For each motive, theoretical arguments and their empirical test are
surveyed.
Section ?? tackles a first source of market failures, which is the existence of
externalities and public good. Governments may provide such goods or correct such
externalities at the optimal level only in the case of perfect information. Otherwise,
privately providing public goods or internalising externalities may occur under the
pressure of the regulator, activists such as NGOs, or altruistic actors. Section ??
develops the CSR literature anchored in a second source of market imperfections
that lies in consumer heterogeneity, generating product differentiation and market
competition strategies. Section ?? presents imperfects contracts as a third source of
market failure that motivates CSR as the delegated responsibility of shareholders,
employees or firm managers in the presence of contract incompleteness. We also
present in section ?? the literature main conclusions on the impact of CSR on firms
competitiveness and performance on the one hand, and on society as a whole on the
other hand, hereby highlighting the lack of knowledge on the latter. Future research
paths are therefore suggested.
2 CSR, Externality Internalisation and Public Good
Provision
Most CSR activities, based in particular on environmental and social factors, aim
at reducing negative externalities (e.g. pollution abatement) or generating positive
externalities and privately providing public goods (e.g. financing hospitals). We
present in this section three types of motivations for such private provision of public
goods: deterring public regulations or public politics, responding to social pressure
or private politics, or exerting one’s own moral duty to undertake social activities.
2.1 CSR, Public Politics and Regulation Preemption
A first determinant of firms’ responsible behaviors arises from the regulator action.
The threat of fines, new regulation compliance and other regulatory costs may in-
duce higher CSR activities, but CSR may also be a response to government failure.
Friedman (1970)’s view on CSR, according to which spending someone else’s money
for a general social interest amounts to taxes and proceeds squandering for “social”
purpose without political legitimacy, in fact vanishes when either government fails
or wishes not to crowd-out private provision of public goods. So do CSR activities
actually substitute for or complement public regulations in terms of public good
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provision, in particular when government fails?
On the one hand, CSR may substitute to the regulation when it preempts it. Lutz
et al. (2000) propose a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation in which a
minimum quality standard increases welfare but negatively impacts industry profits
because reduced quality differentiation intensifies price competition. Thus to reduce
regulatory costs, firms seek to preempt regulations before their promulgation, induc-
ing the regulator to weaken its standards: welfare falls but profits increase. In the
context of “corporate environmentalism”, Maxwell et al. (2000) identify conditions
under which firms can profitably preempt regulatory threats and find that preemp-
tion occurs when industry organizing and lobbying costs are high. Empirical tests
of the preemption theory are often based on case studies (see Arjalies and Ponssard,
2010). Focusing on the metal-finishing industry, Brouhle et al. (2009) econometri-
cally evaluate the respective influence on carbon emissions of a voluntary program
and of the threat of formal regulation. Participation in the program and significant
emission reductions were shown to be related to several forms of external pressure,
including the regulatory threat.
On the other hand, Maxwell and Decker (2006) note that many environmental invest-
ments seem to be aimed at reducing the costs of complying with existing regulations,
thereby suggesting that firm’s environmental performance and regulation are com-
plements rather than substitutes. Here the regulator acts as an enforcer of existing
environmental regulations and responds to voluntary environmental investments by
reducing the frequency with which it monitors the firm. The firm is motivated to
take action because of the reduction of its expected fine. Sam and Innes (2008) em-
pirically support this reinforcement theory by showing that participation in a toxic
waste reduction program (US 33/50) was motivated by the expectation of relaxed
regulatory scrutiny. Using data on approximately 4000 facilities in seven OECD
countries, Johnstone and Labonne (2009) provide strong evidence that environmen-
tal certification serves as a signal to regulatory authorities.
Beyond reinforcement theory, CSR might also complement regulations in cases of
government failures, which have multiple origins (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2010): cap-
ture by lobbies and other interest groups; territoriality of jurisdiction (as for child
labor for instance); a combination of inefficiency, high transaction costs, poor in-
formation and high delivery costs. For instance, the regulator may share the desire
to reduce costs of regulation and thus be willing to negotiate voluntary agreements
(Lyon and Maxwell, 2008).
2.2 CSR as a Response to Social Pressure and Private Pol-
itics
The integration of negative corporate externalities could also be directly demanded
by citizens and social activists. Hence a major determinant of CSR activities would
be to respond to social pressure or deter private politics. As emphasized by Van
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den Berghe and Louche (2005) “companies are facing a new invisible hand, that is
non-market forces exerted by NGOs, media trade-union and others, and influenced
by this new invisible hand, they start to consider CSR as prerequisite for sustainable
growth and welfare”. In turn, when CSR activities consist in private social redistri-
bution and partial internalization of firm externalities, our society might consider
the activity and use of public goods by less responsible firms as socially unfair and
thus withdraw its “license to operate” (Post et al. 2002). When does a corpora-
tion become contestable and how can CSR mitigate contestability? How do social
activists exert pressure on firms? Why are some firms targeted and others not?
According to the theory of contestability, anticipated threats of social protest can
effectively discipline firm’s behavior. Hommel and Godard (2001, 2002) consider
that a firm’s contestability is characterized by its exposure to two types of threats:
contestation of its social license to produce and innovate, based on environmental or
health-related risks to the community attributed to the firm’s products or processes;
and economic contestation from competitors. Hence for a corporate activity to
become contestable, firms need for instance to either be innovators or belong to
notoriously dirty industries, and be significant actors on their market. The link
between firm visibility on its market and CSR level has been found in many empirical
studies (e.g. Margolis and Walsh, 2001). As such, CSR can be a strategic policy to
prevent social contestability and protects the firm long term interests (Hommel and
Godard, 2001).
Most often, social pressure is not directly exerted by citizens but rather by social ac-
tivists, such as Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Defined by Baron (2001)
as “private politics” actors, NGOs make direct demands on corporations enforced ei-
ther by threats (boycott, negative propaganda) or rewards (endorsements), without
reliance on public institutions or shareholders. Baron and Dirmeier (2007) highlight
that the former is likelier than the latter, threats being more likely to decrease the
level of the targeted activity. NGOs campaigns are a powerful lever of social pres-
sure designed to negatively impact sales, employee morale and corporate recruitment
efforts. Moreover, Sinclair-Desgagn¨ı¿1
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and Gozlan (2003) theoretically show that
when NGOs wield big threat, it can induce “green” firms to distinguish themselves
by issuing a detailed CSR report; whereas if weak, they release only moderately
informed CSR reports as other firms do. Based on signaling theory, Feddersen and
Gilligan (2001) also point out that information-supplying activist on a market for
credence goods can alter the decisions of firms and consumers and enhance the so-
cial welfare of market exchange. Focusing on facilities reporting to toxic release
inventory from 1988 to 1994, Sam and Innes (2008) find empirical evidence that
participation in voluntary programs and pollutant reductions were prompted by a
firm’s likelihood of becoming a boycott target.
However, not all contestable firms become the target of social activists. Visibility
is increased by the extent of the public contact, as in consumer-oriented industries
(Margolis and Walsh, 2001) or notoriously dirty industries (Brown et al., 2006).
Siegel and Vitaliano (2007) add that firms selling experience (e.g. a book) or cre-
dence goods (e.g. fair-trade tea) are more likely to be socially responsible than firms
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selling search goods (e.g. a plane ticket). In sum, in this literature, social pressure
appears as a major driver of CSR for large, consumer-oriented or notorious firms
which commit to it in order to protect their license-to-operate. Nevertheless, NGOs
do not necessarily target firms with highest levels of negative externalities. Baron
and Dirmeier (2007) indeed develop a theory of adversarial NGOs campaigns dis-
playing that NGOs prefer to target sequentially one firm rather than multiple firms
simultaneously, pick up issues with high social values, and finally target firms more
likely to be responsive to the campaign. Baron (2009) also highlight that if citi-
zens do not distinguish between morally motivated CSR and CSR induced by social
pressure, the activist is more likely to target the softer, morally motivated firm. In
other words, this “soft firms” hypothesis states that social activists may in fact tar-
get their campaign against morally-managed firms because they have more to lose
from the campaign than do self-interested firms. Empirically support is brought by
Baron et al. (2008) on a large sample of firms over the 1996-2004 period.
2.3 CSR, Altruism and Pro-social Behaviors
Finally, recent developments in psychology and behavioral economics can be used
to examine CSR as a behavior of ’sacrificing profits in the social interest’ (e.g.
Be´nabou and Tirole 2010). In this interpretation, CSR is a pro-social behavior
which reflects the managersw´illingness to engage in philanthropic activities, provide
public good and internalize the negative externalities of their corporations. Typically
this corresponds to Milton Friedman’s view that CSR amounts to spending others’
money for individual pro-social motivations.
Economic agents may want to promote values that are not shared by law-makers.
Because preferences are heterogeneous, it is inevitable that some managersv´alues will
not be fully reflected in policy and projected onto their corporate decisions. Pro-
social behaviors result from several interacting motivations, from intrinsic (genuine)
altruism to extrinsic (material) motivation, social and self-esteem concerns (Be´nabou
and Tirole, 2010). Image concerns may hence act as a cheap incentive device to
induce responsible behaviors. For Baron (2010) as well, CSR may be viewed as self-
regulation motivated by moral concerns. More precisely, he characterizes the scope
of self-regulation as a function of the form and strength of moral preferences and
analyzes how free-riding problems may be mitigated in this context. Empirically,
tests of managers’ pro-social behaviors most often merge with tests of the agency
theory in which CSR is considered as a management perquisite (Baron et al., 2008;
Brown et al., 2006).
Yet, pro-social motivation may also be subject to offsetting effects. Searching out
excessive social prestige may crowd out the incentive provided by publicity on pro-
social behaviors. The more advertised CSR activities are, the more they might be
discounted as mere image-seeking rather than altruism. In this line, Be´nabou and
Tirole (2006) develop a theory of pro-social behavior that combines heterogeneity
in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect.
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Moreover, ‘buying’ social prestige with CSR may even be a zero-sum game. For
instance, the buyer of a hybrid car feels and looks better, but makes his neighbors
(both buyers and non-buyers of hybrid cars) feel and look worse (Be´nabou and
Tirole, 2010). From a public policy perspective, pro-social behaviors stemming
from image concerns imply another externality. In fact, the image value ‘bought’
by a responsible firm increases the private individual return of the firm and partly
reduces the negative social externality costs to be corrected. Hence, CSR motivated
by altruism or pro-social behaviors may substitute partly to publicly provided public
goods.
Finally, individuals can express their moral concerns about the ethical behavior
of companies by means of ethical buying or ethical consumption. How firms can
strategically exploit this consumer preference anchored in pro-social behavior is the
focus of next section.
3 Strategic CSR, Market Competition and Dif-
ferentiation
The second category of CSR behavior determinants lies in product market structure
and competition. In a world populated by heterogeneous consumers including ’green’
actors, a sub-set of producers can be expected to take voluntary steps to improve
their environmental or social performance in order to obtain a label and extract a
green premium. Basically, firms competing in imperfect markets may, and often
do, over-comply with existing laws, thereby developing CSR activities (Reinhardt
and Stavins, 2010). We successively consider product differentiation generated by
consumers’ heterogeneity, subsequent market competition, and their misuse under
the form of green-washing.
3.1 CSR and and Product Differentiation
If a firm can identify customers willing to pay for ethical goods and if it can defend
the resultant niche against imitators, business strategy in this context is like any
other form of product differentiation, with the same basic economics (Reinhardt and
Stavins, 2010): the opportunity arises because of asymmetric information, economies
of scale, and intellectual-property protection.
A large number of articles consider CSR as a product differentiation strategy, with
firms privately producing public goods to attract ethically oriented consumers.
Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) propose a standard model of vertical product differ-
entiation to capture consumer heterogeneity in willingness-to-pay for environmental
attributes. More recently, Besley and Ghatak (2007) examine the optimal level of
CSR provision in a competitive market equilibrium where CSR corresponds to the
creation of public goods and curtailment of public bads jointly with the production
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of private goods, and firms compete for “ethical” and neutral consumers. They
show that in equilibrium, firms sell both ethical and neutral brands, consumers self-
select according to their valuation of the public good, and CSR creates a Pareto
improvement (see also Baron, 2007; Becchetti et al., 2005; Graff Zivin and Small,
2007).
Empirically, opinion polls indeed tend to report an increasing concern for ethical
consumption (De Pelsmacker et al., 2005). For instance, 46% European consumers
claim to be willing to pay substantially more for ethical products (MORI, 2000).
Consumer willingness to pay appears asymmetric between sinners and saints prod-
ucts (the former inducing stronger reactions) and dependent on the CSR issue tack-
led, product quality and individual factors (Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001). In the
food sector, Giraud-Hı¨¿1
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raud and Hoffman (2010) point out how consumers might
be willing to have safe and healthy food but are having difficulties to practically
pay for it. Loureiro and Lotade (2005) also reveal using a face-to-face survey that
consumers are willing to pay higher premiums for fair trade and shade grown coffee
labels than for organic coffee.
From this perspective, labels and certification play a core role in product differ-
entiation strategies to reduce information asymmetry. Indeed, Darby and Karni
(1973) point out that when consumers cannot observe the quality of a firm product,
there are strong incentives for opportunistic behavior, and the resulting equilib-
rium does not maximize social welfare. Credence qualities are those which cannot
be evaluated in normal use, as is the case of CSR, and therefore needs additional
costly information for consumers to believe in it. Labels can be provided by social
activists, as in the signaling model of Feddersen and Gilligan (2001). For Baron
(2010), various types of organizations providing insurance (certification) and infor-
mation (social labels) on CSR have different impacts on free-riding. Social labels
allow individuals with stronger moral preferences to separate from those with weaker
moral preferences, but are not able to expand the scope of self-regulation beyond
that with unconditional altruism. Certifications can do so and attract individuals
with both stronger and weaker moral preferences. Illustrating this effect, Bjorner et
al. (2004) followed a large panel of Danish consumers over 1997-2001 and quantified
at +13-18% the price premium for certified (the Nordic Swan) toilet paper.
3.2 CSR and Market Competition
Product Market competition represents another, yet non trivial, consequence of
actors heterogeneity on CSR. We analyze in turn CSR determinants pertaining to
competition intensity, reduction of production costs, entry barriers, and market
opening thanks to innovation.
Comparing examples of censured activities, Shleifer (2004) identifies that, when
unethical behavior cuts costs, competition drives down prices and entrepreneur in-
comes, thereby reducing their willingness to pay for ethical conduct. Thus unethical
corporate behavior might arise from competition rather than pure greed. However,
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when firms compete for socially responsible consumers by linking the provision of a
public good to sales of their private goods, social activities can become a by-product
of product-market competition. Bagnoli and Watts (2003) hence theoretically show
that the level of private provision of public good varies inversely with the competi-
tiveness of the private-good market. Empirical support of this prediction is brought
in Fernandez-Kranz and Santalo (2010)’s explicit test of the link between product
market competition and CSR. They find that market concentration appears nega-
tively related to environmental and social ratings and that increased competition due
to higher import penetration leads to superior CSR performance. In the same line,
Hull and Rothenberg (2008) also show that CSR most strongly affects performance
in low-innovation firms and in industries with little differentiation.
Reducing production costs to increase profitability is another rationale of market
pressure. The famous Porter’s hypothesis (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995) upholds
that increased input / output efficiency leads to competitive advantage. Widely in-
vestigated, empirical evidence on Porter’s hypothesis still appears mixed. Margolis
et al. (2009)’s meta-analysis concludes on a positive link between corporate environ-
mental policies and profitability, driven by studies such as Derwall et al. (2005) that
focuses on eco-efficiency. Nevertheless, recent works jointly taking into account mul-
tiple dimensions of CSR (environment, human resources, community involvements,
etc.) contradict those findings (Barnett and Salomon, 2006; Brammer et al., 2006).
More directly, Cerin (2006) heavily puts into question the theoretical fundamentals
of the Porter’s hypothesis.
A related determinant of CSR activities lies in raising entry barriers and competi-
tors’ costs. Enforced social or environmental corporate policies can raise regula-
tory barriers for firm competitors. An insightful path is opened by Chambolle and
Giraud-Hı¨¿1
2
raud (2005) who formalize product certification as a non-tariff barrier.
By reducing competition intensity on the protected market, CSR entrance barriers
can increase firm profitability. An illustration is recounted in Lyon and Maxwell
(2008): the Florverde Program would have enabled the European cut flower market
suppliers to be chosen based on pesticides use, thus inducing Columbian producers
to promote environmentally friendly practices. However, empirical evidence beyond
specific case studies is scarce in the literature.
The last element of competition related to CSR is innovation, which has been the
focus of several empirical papers. Lanoie et al. (2011) use data on 4200 facili-
ties in seven OECD countries and find strong support for environmental regulation
stimulating environmental innovations. Wagner (2008) also find that environmental
management systems are associated with process innovation, while product inno-
vation are more induced by information to consumers and eco-labelling. Based on
survey data, Demirel and Kesidou (2011) show that eco-innovation (such as end
of pipeline technologies, integrated cleaner production) is driven by the need for
increased efficiency; whereas environmental regulation stimulates end of pipeline
technologies and environmental research and development. Market innovation can
also take social forms, as in the Bottom-of-the-Pyramid strategies. For instance,
Murphy et al. (2012) highlight how firms can invest in social issues to prepare new
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market opportunities in emerging countries.
3.3 Reputation and Greenwashing
Whereas ethical consumption and agentsh´eterogeneity can ground product differen-
tiation and strategic market competition, the credence good property of CSR makes
it very dependent on information asymmetry and increases the risk of free-riding.
However, free riding on CSR can turn out to be highly damageable for firm reputa-
tion.
As an increasing number of firms nowadays make a lot of effort to appear as socially
responsible, many of them are criticized for being “greenwashers”. Greenwashing
is a term generally used when significantly more money or time has been spent ad-
vertising being green (that is, operating with consideration for the environment),
rather than spending resources on environmentally sound practices. Greenwashing
in a sense echoes Be´nabou and Tirole (2006)’s theory of pro-social behavior that
combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social
reputation. Those authors show how doubt is thus created about the true motive
for which good deeds are performed, which can lead to a reduction of social wel-
fare (the reputation-stealing effect). As put by Walley and Whitehead (1994), “it
is not easy being green”. Indeed, if the consumer’s willingness to pay for CSR is
insufficient, ethical standard adhesion costs represent a competitive disadvantage.
An illustration is provided by Bagnoli and Watts (2003) who show that if conven-
tional products are highly competitive with low prices, fewer consumers wish to
buy “green”. Moreover, CSR being in essence a transparent activity, even if the
early mover advantage does enhance profits, it soon erodes as competitive strategies
copy it (Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube, 2001; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Beyond
anecdotes, greenwashing has already been pinned down in a few empirical papers.
In particular, Kim and Lyon (2008) compare voluntary disclosures of reductions of
greenhouse gas emissions in the electric utility sector against actual emissions and
demonstrate that, in the aggregate, the program had no effect on carbon intensity.
Yet protecting firm reputation is an important motive for CSR activities beyond
greenwashing. Consumers’ memory can indeed be long-lasting. Kotler and Lee
(2005) hence develop a framework that explains why charitable activities are good
for business from a marketing perspective. Portney (2008) highlights that the firms’
belief that beyond compliance behavior will help curry favor with current and poten-
tial future customers is particularly true for firms in the food and consumer product
businesses. Linking advertising, competition and CSR, Fisman et al. (2006) present
a signaling model in which CSR may serve as a means of vertical differentiation in a
market where quality is difficult to observe. Analyzing natural experiments on eBay
where sellers offer identical products with and without charity donations, Elfenbein
et al. (2012) observe behaviors in line with Fisman et al. (2006) predictions. Based
on a sample of over 150,000 auctions, they observe that in the presence of little
information about the reliability of a seller, charity commitments play a significant
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role in establishing trust. Also supporting Fisman et al. (2006)’s theoretical pre-
dictions, Brown et al. (2006) find that firms that advertise more intensively also
give more to charity, while Hines and Ames (2000) report that 68% of interviewed
consumers claimed to have bought a product or service because of a firm CSR rep-
utation. CSR thus appears as a lever to build up firm reputation, considered as a
strategic intangible asset.
4 CSR as Delegated Responsibility
The third category of market imperfections grounding CSR strategies is anchored in
imperfect contracts. Indeed, responsibility of the firm might implicitly be extended
by its majors stakeholders towards environmental, social and governance issues in
the presence of contract incompleteness. This section hence surveys the literature
on CSR considered as the delegated responsibility of successively firm shareholders,
then firm employees and lastly firm managers.
4.1 CSR and Responsible Investors
Among all stakeholders, shareholders hold a major stand with full legitimacy to
ask, in addition to fiduciary duties, the firm they own to engage in CSR. In a review
of shareholder activism to promote CSR, Sjo¨stro¨m (2008) underlines that five key
themes emerge in the literature: (i) shareholder proposals in the United States,
including proposal topics and voting results; (ii) the effects of shareholder activism
on corporate policy and practice; and shareholders activism by respectively: (iii)
NGOs; (iv) unions and (v) pension funds. We here focus on the literature about
shareholder delegated responsibility undertaken by socially responsible investors.
We first present literature describing those investors and then their impacts on
CSR.
In both Europe and the United States, about 1 dollar out of 9 is estimated to
incorporate environmental, social and governance consideration in the investment
decision process (Eurosif 2010; Social Investment Forum 2010). Consequently, the
impact of socially responsible investors on firms’ business strategies can be a very
powerful determinant of CSR strategies. Chatterji et al. (2009) distinguish four
motivations of social investors: financial (believing that CSR increases firm per-
formance), deontological (not willing to profit from unethical or heinous actions),
consequentialist (rewarding good behavior and providing incentive) and expressive
(expressing personal identity to yourself or others). Delegated responsibility covers
essentially those last three points. Investors are also highly aware of regulatory con-
text and opportunities, as illustrated in Takeda and Tomozawa (2008) investigation
of stock price reactions to the release of environmental management ranking (issued
by a Nikkei newspaper) in Japan from 1998 to 2005. Their results indicate that mar-
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ket reactions were changed between 2001 and 2002, when the Japanese government
showed its strong commitment to environmental policies.
From a theoretical perspective, the impact of responsible investors on CSR strategies
relates to the abundant literature on the link between financial performance and
CSR that will be detailed in section 5 (e.g. Cappelle-Blancard and Monjon, 2010).
This literature focuses on the trade-off between different types of performance. One
possibility is that environmental or social performance improves to the detriment of
classical financial performance. Another possibility is that both types of performance
are correlated, in the short run, or at least in the long run. One way to answer these
issues is to analyze the impact of responsible practices on the cost of capital. Heinkel
et al. (2001) demonstrate that 20% of social activists are needed in the market for it
to impact firm’s capital cost, which is empirically verified by Hong and Kacperczyk
(2009). As highlighted by Lee (2008), the recent rise of the socially responsible
investment movement had a significant impact on CSR.
Other types of studies provide insightful information on the link between socially re-
sponsible investments and performance. Modeling socially responsible investments
as a composite commodity which combines a financial investment product with a
charitable giving vehicle, Graff Zivin and Small (2007) show that rents are not nec-
essarily lower in case of natural monopolies, niche markets, imperfect information,
regulatory distortions, anti takeover laws and other market imperfections. Empiri-
cally, Van de Velde et al. (2005) display no performance difference between socially
responsible and conventional funds when they control for style differences within the
portfolio. Barnett and Salomon (2006) combine modern portfolio and stakeholder
theories, and hypothesize that the financial loss born by a socially responsible fund
due to poor diversification is offset as social screening intensifies because better-
managed and more stable firms are selected into its portfolio. In view of those
studies, socially responsible investment thus appears as an increasing and effective
lever which can penalize firms with insufficient CSR, at least without harming in-
vestor profitability, likely improving it on the long run.
4.2 CSR and Employee Motivation
The second category of stakeholders whose responsibility can be delegated through
CSR is the labour force. We first present the literature on the interactions of global
CSR and employees, before focusing on proactive human resources policies.
As a starting point, CSR can appear as a signal for corporate culture. Brekke and
Nyborg (2008) demonstrate in their model that ”green” firms can recruit motivated
employees with team work values and hereby secure firm survival and long-term per-
formance. Based on propositions from social identity theory and signaling theory,
Turban and Greening (1997) also highlight that CSR can attract good employees,
while Albinger and Freeman (2000) empirically find that it only concerns highly
qualified employees. High level of CSR can also reduce costly employee turnover
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(Portney 2008). Moreover, motivated employees might be likely to accept lower
wages than the fair market value because they are compensated through the knowl-
edge that their work satisfies their personal values, as illustrated by Frank (1996)
in an experiment on Cornell University graduates. Lanfranchi and Pekovic (2011)
observe as well that employees working for “green” firms are significantly more likely
to report a higher feeling of usefulness in their job and to describe themselves as
fairly valued than other workers in France in 2006. Whereas those employees do not
claim to be more actively involved in their job, they are nevertheless significantly
more likely, ceteris paribus, to work uncompensated for supplementary work hours.
Proactive human resources policy in itself appears to increase firm performance
through productivity. This positive link is found by Jones and Murrell (2001) on
the stock returns of the 51 firms included in the Working Mother List; by Galbreath
(2006) on employee treatment in Australia; or by Edmans (2010) on the stock returns
of the 100 Best Companies to Work For in America. Analysis tackling joint CSR
dimensions also find a positive link between the human resources dimension and
financial performance (Barnett and Salomon, 2006; Brammer et al., 2006).
In sum, while socially responsible investment appears as an effective lever to pe-
nalize firms for insufficient CSR, proactive CSR can enhance employee productivity
through various paths. Both are linked to what investors and potential future em-
ployees believe the firm true CSR level is. People beliefs and firm reputation are
also deeply related to the level of pressure society exerts on companies.
4.3 CSR, Governance and the Managers-Shareholders Re-
lationship
Finally, CSR can be the delegated responsibility of those who manage the firm:
CEOs and boards of directors, the latter linking the former to shareholders. The
whole purpose of governance is to organize the relationships and responsibilities
between those three layers. A specific case is CEOs - owners, which we first detail,
before surveying the literature on CSR and respectively firm managers and boards.
Regarding the role of CEOs in CSR strategies, founding and owning CEOs have
all power to choose their firm’s CSR level in line with their business model and
personal objectives. Examples of such owners involve Yvon Chouinard, founder
of the outdoor company Patagonia, or Frank Riboud, CEO of the food and water
company Danone. Nevertheless, putting aside the large population of small and
medium size enterprises, firms are seldom both owned and managed by the same
people. Baron (2007) discusses a model of social entrepreneurship in which social
entrepreneurs prefer to create CSR firms. For them and their shareholders, corporate
giving is then a good substitute for personal giving.
When CEOs are neither owners nor backed up by philanthropic shareholders, ac-
cording to Friedman (1970), their responsibility is then to ensure profitability. If
CEOs embark firms on CSR, they might misappropriate shareholder funds for op-
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portunistic reasons. Anchored in the agency theory, such a CSR could thus be a
perquisite for managers who like the accolades of the advocates of broadened social
performance (Baron et al., 2008). Bringing the argument a step forward, Cespa and
Cestone (2007) build an entrenchment theory portraying CSR strategies as a way for
inefficient managers to ensure stakeholders’ support to reinforce their own position
at the expense of the shareholders. However, company value and manager rotation
increase when shareholders engage in an explicit protection of the stakeholders that
does not go through the manager, hence depriving her of activists’ support. Such
a finding provides a rationale for the emergence of specialized institutions (social
auditors and ethic indexes) that help firms commit to stakeholder protection even
in the case of managerial replacement.
If the agency theory proves right, a twofold prediction should be empirically verified:
first, CSR increases with slack resources and discretion available to management;
second, the causality is orientated from firm performance to CSR. If Baron et al.
(2008) indeed find that responsive corporate social performance increases with slack
resources, few other studies successfully investigated yet the true causality (Margolis
et al., 2009). Using a different approach, Reinhardt et al. (2008) suggest that the
relationship between CSR and CEO compensation may be close to flat at some
levels of firm performance, and that CEOs may trade off compensation against
CSR activities. However this is not empirically verified by Frye et al. (2006) in
their comparison of CEOs compensations of firms listed in the Domini Social Index
with other firms in similar industries. Socially responsible firms nonetheless have
a higher CEOs turnover when firm performance is bad, which put into question
the entrenchment theory. Moreover, stock options grant does not increase CEOs
risk taking behaviors in socially responsible firms as it does in conventional ones.
Reinhardt et al. (2008) conclude that it might be anyway less costly for investors
and shareholders to accept a degree of principal-agent slack than to eliminate it
completely, because excessively constrained managers may be ineffective.
Yet, firm management does not only hold on its CEO, but also on its board of
directors. The board’s impact on CSR activities seems to have seldom been tackled
both empirically and theoretically. Some empirical studies nonetheless display a
link between CSR and governance, which raises questions about the link between
governance and performance. Indeed, Brown et al. (2006) show that firms with
larger boards of directors are associated with significantly more cash giving and
with the establishment of corporate foundations, whereas Jo and Harjoto (2011)
highlight that engagement in CSR in positively associated with board independence
and institutional ownership. Gompers et al. (2003) support the hypothesis that
well-governed companies outperform their poorly governed counterparts by about
8.5%. However, Core et al. (2006) challenge their results. Interestingly, Bauer et
al. (2003) find substantial differences between the U.K. market and the Eurozone
markets: the lower the governance standards, the stronger the relationship between
governance and firm value.
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5 CSR and performance
In previous sections, we identified and surveyed the major determinants of CSR.
Understanding those drivers is core to analyze why and how firms would engage in
CSR and how this engagement is likely to impact their activities. We now precisely
focus on this impact by surveying the large literature investigating the link between
CSR and firm performance, before discussing research on the actual impact of CSR
on society to highlight how CSR can or not relate to sustainable development.
5.1 CSR and financial performance
The link between CSR and firm performance has triggered considerable academic
work, as witnessed by the numerous surveys dedicated to this literature (e.g. Griffin
and Mahon, 1997; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Portney, 2008;
Scholtens, 2008; Van Beurden and Gossling, 2008). The active debate on whether
this link actually exists can be considered as closed by the extensive meta-analysis
conducted by Margolis et al. (2009) on 251 studies: ”The effect of corporate social
performance on corporate financial performance is small, positive and significant.
Corporate social performance does not destroy shareholder value, even if its effect
on the value is not large”. However, many scholars still consider that much research
is still needed to fully understand the drivers of this relationship, or, put differently,
how firms succeed on both financial and social levels (Horva´thova´, 2010; Surroca et
al., 2010).
Such research should avoid the numerous biases and problems of previous work
that have been pointed out in the literature among which: omitted variables in the
determinants of profitability (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000); model misspecifica-
tion and endogeneity (Garcia-Castro et al., 2010); limited data (small samples, old
periods; Horva´thova´, 2010); cross-sectional analysis invalid in the presence of signif-
icant firm heterogeneity (Elsayed and Paton, 2005); linearity assumptions (Barnett
and Salomon, 2006); wide diversity of measures used to assess financial perfor-
mance (Margolis and Walsh, 2003). Another problem also lies in the direction and
mechanisms of causation. Whether CSR would lead (or not) to superior firm per-
formance, or whether financial performance would rather be a necessary condition
for CSR is a major stake to investigate (see Margolis et al., 2009). For instance,
Wagner (2010) uses panel data to disentangle the effects of CSR, advertising and
R&D over time. Problems of measurement of CSR have also been pointed out and
are core to understand the potentiality of CSR as a sustainable development tool.
For instance, Iwata and Okada (2011) consider the effect of two different environ-
mental issues (waste and greenhouse gas emissions) on financial performance using
panel data of Japanese manufacturing firms from 2004 to 2008 and show that the
responses of financial performance are different depending on each environmental
issues. Considering different measures of economic and financial performance, Del-
mas and Nairn-Birch (2010) also show that environmental performance (increasing
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carbon emissions) positively impacts financial performance when using accounting
based measures (e.g. return on assets) but negatively affects market based measures
of financial performance (e.g. Tobin’s q).
The complex nature of CSR leads to another promising research path. Some recent
works suggest that it should be a specific combination of firm policies that would
likely lead to superior corporate performance. During the 1990s, this complemen-
tarity between different managerial practices has proven a useful explanation of the
Solow paradox, whereby “you can see the computer age everywhere but in the pro-
ductivity statistics” (Solow, 1987). Indeed, several researchers have shown that only
those firms that have adopted both computerization and complementary innovative
human resources management practices (teamwork, multi-tasking, quality circles,
etc.) did enjoy superior performance (e.g. Ichniowski and Shaw, 2003). By analogy,
the apparently ambiguous relationship between CSR and firm performance could
presumably be explained by taking into account the complementarity between the
multi-dimensional facets of CSR. Taking into account CSR as a multi-dimensional
strategy is all the more important since, as pointed out by Be´nabou and Tirole
(2010), firms can do well on some dimensions and poorly on others. Such a research
would renew the debate on the link between CSR and performance.
5.2 CSR and Extra Financial Performance
If CSR amounts to privately provided public goods, it is important to be able to
evaluate its impact not only on economic and financial performance, but also on
social performance. Lee (2008) and Abeysuriya et al. (2007) already called for
more attention to the social side of the equation. The key question of whether firms
can be efficient actors of sustainable development definitely needs to be tackled,
all the more as it has drawn little attention in the CSR field. We first present
the theoretical literature on CSR impact on welfare depending on its origin (public
politics; private politics; product differentiation), before analyzing some empirical
findings. We conclude by proposing research paths to extend the required toolbox
for more comprehensive analysis.
Theoretical results on the impact of CSR on social welfare are mixed (Lyon and
Maxwell, 2008), as CSR is not necessarily beneficial, depending very much on the
context in which it occurs. For Besley and Ghatak (2007) who examine the opti-
mal level of CSR provision, CSR can create a pareto improvement in equilibrium.
Whereas CSR can be a less costly substitute for government mandates and hence
increase welfare, it can also distort regulatory decisions in a way that lowers it.
Maxwell and Decker (2006) found in their enforcement theory that, despite the fact
that all agents in the model act voluntarily, their actions may lead to a suboptimal
level of environmental investment. Fleckinger and Glachant (2011) demonstrate that
the impact of self-regulation on social welfare depends on the set of policy instru-
ments available to the regulator (mandatory regulation or voluntary agreements).
For Lyon and Maxwell (2008), overall, the impact of preemptive CSR depends upon
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whether it is undertaken unilaterally or through a voluntary agreement with the reg-
ulator, and whether the regulator is welfare-maximizing or influenced by particular
interest groups.
In terms of private politics, is social pressure from NGOS beneficial for the society as
negative externalities are reduced? To answer this issue, Heyes and Maxwell (2004)
compare the relative merits of two types of self regulation mechanisms: mandatory
through an international organization setting a constraining (environmental or so-
cial) standard, and voluntary through an NGO operating labeling schemes. Their
model shows that the level of industry resistance to the standard is greater when
there exists an NGO than when there does not (voluntary labels being more attrac-
tive when defeating the international organization proposal). In turn, though the
anticipation of industry resistance leads the international organization to decrease
the stringency of its standard, the NGO may serve a ‘back-stop’ function and en-
courage more stringent international standard. Moreover, the authors show that
when both the voluntary and mandatory scheme co-exist, the existence of NGOS
increases welfare. However, by inducing firms to lobby against government stan-
dards, it is also possible that the existence of NGO labeling schemes can undermine
government regulatory programs that would be of even greater value (Lyon and
Maxwell, 2008).
CSR used as a pure market tool lacks studies on its actual impact on society. Intu-
itively, CSR certification might increase the sales of environmentally (e.g. recycled)
or socially (e.g. fair trade) friendly products, thus increasing the utility of consumers
who switch from conventional to green products. If green products substitute to
conventional ones, as on a mature market with stable sales, social welfare might
increase. However, if the market is expanding, the increasing overall sales might
generate social damage. One can think for instance of the debate generated by
green products whose global life-cycle analysis turn out to be more polluting than
conventional products. Moreover, Faucheux and Nicolai (1998) argue that the state
intervention is needed to avoid firm competition driven technological lock-ins. Ap-
plying the Coase theorem and thus bringing transactions costs and property rights
to fore, Cerin (2006) also highlights that strong public support is necessary to cre-
ate private incentives for exploring significant economic and environmental win-win
innovations.
Empirical tests of those theoretical predictions are still scarce in the CSR literature,
at least from the economics and management science perspective. An interesting
example is the evaluation done by Brouhle et al. (2009) of two environmental policy
levers (a voluntary program and the threat of formal regulation) on emissions in
the metal-finishing industry. They find that participation in the voluntary program
yielded little, if any, additional reductions in emissions. However, while participants
do not appear to take advantage of the program initially, they make greater strides in
reducing emissions than non-participants in later years. Another input is brought by
Dam and Scholtens (2008) who demonstrate that firms with high level of CSR are less
likely to relocalize their production in countries with weak environmental regulation
(the pollution heaven hypothesis). However, little studies tackle the impacts of CSR
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on multiple aspects simultaneously, as conducted for instance in product life-cycle
analysis.
From this perspective, the toolbox to evaluate CSR impact on society could likely
benefit from the experience gathered in other fields. For instance, lessons from public
policy analysis and development economics might be drawn and transferred to ana-
lyze the respective impact of various CSR policies on public welfare. Methodologies
such as impact evaluation methods relying on experimental and quasi- experimental
designs could also be insightful.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes a comprehensive framework to analyze the economics determi-
nants of CSR. We hence survey how CSR is driven by market imperfections such
as corporate externalities, private provision of public goods, agents heterogeneity
and imperfect contracts. Understanding the economics of CSR is core to take a
step out of the long lasting debate of whether engaging in CSR generates profits
for corporations and to provide research paths to follow in order to understand how
can firms succeed on both financial and social levels. To do so, further research is
precisely needed on the evaluation of the social impact of CSR.
In its 2009 report, the Global Environment Outlook of the United Nations Envi-
ronmental Program stated that “efforts to slow the rate or extent of change [to the
Earth system] including enhanced resource efficiency and mitigation measures have
resulted in moderate successes but have not succeeded in reversing adverse environ-
mental changes. Neither the scope of these nor their speed has abated in the past
five years”. It also highlights that “the lack of reliable and consistent time-series
data on the state of the environment is a major barrier to increasing the effective-
ness of policies and programs. (...) All countries should undertake to monitor and
assess their own environment and integrate social, economic and environmental in-
formation to inform decision-making processes”. No less can be said about CSR and
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